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On 1 January 2019, Germany began its two-year term as a non-permanent 
member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). As the country has 
started the second year of its tenure, this GIGA Focus takes stock of Ger-
many’s achievements thus far. It points to the challenges, and then suggests 
strategies through which Germany could widen the reach and deepen the 
impact of its work.
 •  Germany deserves to be commended for its achievements in the UNSC at three 
levels. At a macro level, it has helped revive and enrich a global debate on mul-
tilateralism. At an operational level, it has initiated some valuable and detailed 
proposals for action. At a symbolic level, it has made some helpful moves.
 • Despite these achievements, German diplomatic efforts to build support for 
multilateralism face several challenges. Within Germany, even though there 
seems to be support for international cooperation, there is ambiguity amongst 
the German electorate on what multilateralism actually means. Externally, al-
though Germany has tried to build international support for multilateralism, 
including via its initiative “Alliance for Multilateralism,” it is not clear what 
values underpin the concept nor whom Germany regards as its real allies. 
 • The challenges, in turn, derive from the fact that the German foreign policy 
establishment has paid insufficient attention to the values that should underpin 
multilateralism. It has also largely failed – thus far – to develop a convincing 
narrative for multilateralism. Plus it has ignored a fundamental risk to exist-
ing multilateral institutions that derives from “weaponised interdependence.” 
Without attention to these three issues, it will be difficult for Germany to have a 
meaningful and constructive impact on the debate and practice of multilateralism.
Policy Implications
To get more bang for its buck, Germany needs to a) have a fundamental rethink 
on the values that underpin – or should underpin – its own foreign policy, and 
how these values connect with its quest to reform multilateralism b) develop a 
winning and sustainable narrative for multilateralism that appeals to multiple 
layers of society and c) explore ideas for a fundamental reform of multilateral 
organisations, taking into account geoeconomic considerations. 
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On 1 January, 2019, Germany began its two-year tenure as a non-permanent mem-
ber of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The fact that this is the sixth 
time in the history of the UN that Germany has occupied this role should not dilute 
the import of its election to the UNSC this time round: at a moment when multilat-
eralism faces severe challenge from multiple sides, the burden of responsibility that 
rests on the shoulders of members is especially high. It is also worth mentioning 
that Germany officially announced its decision to campaign for a non-permanent 
seat at the UNSC on 27 June, 2016, at a GIGA Distinguished Speaker Lecture de-
livered by the then Foreign Minister (and now Federal President) Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier. The history of the initiative is, in some ways, thus nicely connected with 
the history of our research institute. 
This GIGA Focus proceeds in three sections. [1] The first provides an assess-
ment of Germany’s record in the UNSC thus far. Although only half-way through 
its term, Germany deserves credit for some important achievements. The second 
section points to the challenges and limitations that Germany still faces. The third 
section offers possible policy actions whereby these challenges could be addressed.
1. Why Germany’s Efforts Matter
The UNSC is not the only multilateral forum where Germany has shown proac-
tive engagement. To name just a handful of examples: in December 2016, Germany 
hosted the Ministerial Council of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE); in June 2017, it held the presidency for the leaders’ level G20, 
and thereby facilitated multilateral cooperation across several issue-areas ranging 
from trade, excess capacity in steel to Agenda 2030 and the Compact with Africa. 
This year, in January 2020, Germany became one of the 47 elected members that 
constitute the UN Human Rights Council; in July 2020, it will take up the rotating 
Presidency of the European Council. Just how intrinsic multilateralism is to mod-
ern Germany is nicely captured by Thomas Bagger: 
“If “Never Again” was the first fundamental lesson drawn from the collapse of 
civilization during the Nazi years that was meant to address the challenge of Ger-
many’s history, “Never Alone” was clearly the second most important and deeply 
ingrained imperative. Multilateralism was at the heart of German foreign policy 
as it emerged after the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949—it was designed 
to solve the second part of the “German question,” the challenge of geography that 
put, at the center of the continent, a country that was “too big for Europe, too small 
for the world.” If anything, this conviction was further reinforced by the German 
reading of how unification after 1989 finally came about.” (Bagger 2019)
Germany’s current drive towards strengthening multilateralism thus has roots 
in the country’s post World War II identity, and how it chose to embed itself in the 
community of European and world nations. In this sense, German engagement with 
multilateral institutions is not new. But the international context of multilateralism 
has itself undergone a drastic alteration in recent years. 
Since around the turn of the millennium, multilateral cooperation had lan-
guished for a variety of reasons. These included the rise of new powers (e.g. Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa) with sometimes different visions of global 
order from the incumbents, and institutional limitations that rendered existing 
1  Parts of the argument 
presented in this article 
have been made in Narlikar 
(2020b and 2020c).
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decision-making rules ill-suited to large and diverse memberships (e.g. consensus-
based decision-making in a WTO that had come to include over 160 members). 
Recent years have seen an exacerbation of the problem, in good measure due to 
the increasing disengagement of the US from the system. This trend predates the 
arrival of President Trump on the scene: President Obama had also signalled the 
reluctance of the US to be the main bearer of the responsibility of providing global 
public goods (“Free riders aggravate me,” Goldberg 2016). President Trump has 
taken this critique further, for instance lambasting the WTO “the single worst deal 
ever made.” In September 2019, addressing the UN General Assembly, he issued at 
least a covert challenge to multilateralism by overtly rejecting “globalism,”
“Wise leaders always put the good of their own people and their own country 
first. The future does not belong to globalists. The future belongs to patriots […] 
Globalism exerted a religious pull over past leaders, causing them to ignore their 
own national interests. But as far as America is concerned, those days are over.” 
(Trump 2019)
Nor is the President’s professed contempt for globalism – and indeed its multi-
lateral instruments – mere “cheap talk.” By withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, 
and by triggering a complete paralysis of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
(by blocking the appointment/ reappointment of members of the Appellate Body), 
the US has given short shrift to multilateral rules and institutions, not only in words 
but also in deeds. With the founder and guarantor of the post-war system of global 
governance – and still the world’s hegemonic power, even if somewhat diminished 
in relative terms – showing such readiness to walk away from the rules that it had 
once created and upheld, multilateralism needs all the help it can get. Against this 
difficult background, the efforts that Germany is leading are all the more commend-
able.
Germany, along with other international players (most notably France), has 
made a deliberate effort to defend multilateralism and rebuild support for it. It has 
done this at three levels: at the macro level, at the operational level, and at a sym-
bolic level. 
At the macro level, Germany has played a key role in raising awareness of the 
continued importance of multilateralism, even as the US has challenged it and un-
dermined it. Compare, for instance, Heiko Maas’s speech at the UN General Assem-
bly to Trump’s, and the difference in approach is striking:
“Anyone who loves their country will be committed to cooperation. Because 
only if we work together will we all have a future. Sustainable foreign policy is mul-
tilateral foreign policy. It is this very concept that underpins the United Nations. It 
is also the guiding principle for German and European foreign policy […]
[…] Cooperation is anything but a betrayal of one’s own country. Rather, it cre-
ates the preconditions for our countries’ security and prosperity.” (Maas 2019)
Germany has backed its plaidoyer on the value of international cooperation 
through multilateral institutions, and in keeping with the refrain of “never alone,” 
with an innovative idea – an Alliance for Multilateralism. In 2018, at the Heads of 
Mission’s Conference in Berlin, Heiko Maas had advanced the following concept: 
“We are thinking here about a network of partners who stand up together for 
the preservation and further development of the rules-based order, who defend 
multilateralism and who are willing to use political capital to this end because they 
understand what multilateralism truly means. Multilateralism means investing in 
   4    GIGA FOCUS | GLOBAL | NO. 2 | MARCH 2020 
an order when doing so does not lead to an immediate benefit for oneself, but se-
cure in the knowledge that one can rely on this order when needed one day.” (Maas 
2018a)
While the idea to unify a group of like-minded countries around the idea of 
multilateralism was a good starting point, the list of initial candidates was not par-
ticularly original. In his guest op-ed piece for the Handelsblatt, for instance, Maas 
mentioned Canada, Japan, and South Korea (Maas 2018b). If this was going to be 
the core group, then the Alliance risked reducing itself to yet another attempted in-
carnation of an elite club of liberal democracies, preaching to the already converted. 
Critique followed (e.g. Narlikar 2019). In fairness to the Foreign Minister and his 
team, the outreach to potential partners improved and expanded in the following 
months. When the alliance had its first meeting in September 2019, co-organised by 
France and Germany, it no longer looked like a “Rich Man’s Club” [2] and involved 
some 50 countries from the world’s different regions (Alliance for Multilateralism 
2019). India, for example, a country traditionally wary of joining “alliances” issued 
an enthusiastic press statement in September to support the initiative:
“India is delighted to join the Alliance for Multilateralism and appreciates the 
initiative of France and Germany. We do so because we believe that multilateralism 
matters, really matters and it is under stress today as much as from nationalism, 
as from mercantilism. The Kindleberger trap on the shortage of global goods is far 
more serious than the Thucydides Trap […].” (India Statement 2019)
France and Germany have together helped create an awareness of the virtues 
of multilateralism, reminding different stakeholders that its gains cannot be taken 
for granted; additionally, by developing his Alliance for Multilateralism, Maas has 
created a potential group of vital international supporters for the concept. 
Importantly, the collective leadership that Germany has advanced to sup-
port multilateralism includes attention to the actual practice of multilateralism. 
Through a variety of measures in the last year, Germany has highlighted key dimen-
sions that need to be included in debates on security (Prager 2019). While address-
ing current conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Iran, Germany has also emphasised the 
importance of conflict prevention stating, “We want to change the structure of the 
UN Security Council’s work. Right now, we only deal with crises, conflicts and wars 
when they have already taken place. People have to die. And it is not enough for 
them to starve to death or to die of thirst. One has to be a victim of armed violence” 
(UN 2019). Consistent with the call to expand the global community’s understand-
ing of security, Maas has taken a particular interest in raising concerns about the 
impact of climate change on conflict. Germany’s sponsorship of Resolution 2467 for 
combating sexual violence in conflict was another important step in bringing a vital 
human dimension into security debates (UN 2019). Additionally, Germany has also 
highlighted the urgency of putting more traditional concerns, such as disarmament, 
back on the agenda.
Besides providing a frame for the debate on the value of multilateralism, and 
also getting things done at a nitty-gritty level, Germany deserves credit for some 
moves that it has made at a symbolic level. For the first time since 1964, on 3 April 
2019, Christoph Heusgen, the German Ambassador to the United Nations, had the 
curtains opened in the Security Council chamber. The German Mission to the UN 
tweeted: “Sunshine ☀ during today’s debate in the #UNSC – a rare occurrence 
throughout its 75-year history. #Transparency & openness to broader @UN mem-
2 This was a term that 
developing countries 
would use for the WTO’s 
predecessor – the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT).
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bership & civil society are crucial not just symbolically, but also in practice for cred-
ibility & legitimacy” (twitter 2019). France and Germany also decided to coordinate 
their successive presidencies to demonstrate their shared commitment to multilat-
eralism and European values. On their own, these gestures might not have added up 
to much. But when accompanying the legwork that Germany put in throughout the 
last year on both the macro-level and the operational level, the promise of improved 
transparency and better coordination may be seen as the icing on the cake. 
2. Challenges and Limitations 
At a time when multilateralism is in dire need of champions, Germany (together 
with France and others) has emerged as a powerful advocate and defender of global 
cooperation. But despite all the good intentions driving its foreign policy, there are 
several challenges that Germany faces.
First, it is true that insofar as actions speak louder than words, Germany’s ac-
tions since the end of World War II have shown that its leadership sees its country’s 
interests and identity as deeply embedded in multilateral institutions. But what this 
actually means for the German electorate is, in fact, not entirely clear, at least in 
recent times. In a survey conducted by the Körber Foundation last year, 67 per cent 
of Germans did not know what multilateralism meant, 50 per cent said they did not 
associate anything with the word, and 42 per cent said that they had never heard of 
the term (Körber Foundation 2019).
If the survey does indeed reflect the sentiments of the general German popula-
tion, then these results should be troubling. German foreign policy seems to be built 
on a principle that its own people do not understand. Once the people surveyed 
were given the meaning of the term, “Germans proved to be great supporters of 
multilateralism” (Körber Foundation 2019: 6). But in this context, the failure of 
what populists tend to call the “global elite” to clarify what multilateralism stands 
for in the first place should be even more galling. Even though a majority of its 
population supports globalisation and international cooperation, it seems that gov-
ernment officials, academics, think-tankers and others have not done a good job 
in explaining why multilateral institutions and rules are necessary for preserving 
globalisation and international cooperation. Clearly, better and more engagement 
is needed at all levels of German society to facilitate greater clarity on the concept 
at the very least, and preferably also to address and incorporate the concerns of a 
small but vocal minority (yes, from the extreme Right and Left, but also sometimes 
the political centre including the Greens). If Germany’s attempt to defend, rescue, 
and reform multilateralism is to succeed, it cannot be done meaningfully without 
the strong backing of its own electorate.
Second, externally too, it is not clear what the Alliance for Multilateralism 
stands for, nor who qualifies to belong to the group. In an effort to be inclusive, the 
tendency thus far has been to refer to the alliance as a loose network, with countries 
pragmatically joining forces over specific issue-areas and concerns. But this strat-
egy of defending multilateralism à la carte seems to get the wrong end of the stick. 
A flexible and pragmatic network of countries that selectively claims to stand 
for multilateralism per se does not, in fact, help the cause. Countries with divergent 
interests, and indeed highly polarised understandings of how the rules should work, 
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can legitimately claim to – and indeed do – defend some form of multilateralism. 
China, for example, presented itself as a guardian of the multilateral trading system 
at the World Economic Forum in 2017, at a time when the US was already giving 
clear signs that it would be willing to take a wrecking ball to it; it is only now becom-
ing apparent though that China’s understanding of how the system should function 
is quite different from its many western (and indeed southern) counterparts (Brad-
sher 2020). But neither China nor those who contest its interpretation of the rules 
(for example, in the context of the WTO) are wrong. This is because multilateralism 
is an instrument of international cooperation – no more and no less. It is up to us 
to decide on the content – the underlying values – that multilateral instruments 
should uphold, and the goals that they should pursue. Simply aggregating countries 
that actually stand for fundamentally different societal and political goals – e.g. 
liberalism and pluralism versus authoritarianism, or free markets versus state-con-
trolled enterprises – into an Alliance for Multilateralism will not help resolve the 
crisis that multilateralism faces today.
Besides the key question of values, equally important to the challenges that 
Germany faces is the issue of narratives. A narrative is “a simple story or easily 
expressed explanation of events that many people want to bring up in conversation 
or on news or social media because it can be used to stimulate the concerns or emo-
tions of others, and/ or because it appears to advance self-interest” (Shiller 2017; 
italicisation added for emphasis). And so far, neither Germany, nor France, nor any 
other player in the Alliance for Multilateralism, has come up with a convincing nar-
rative on why people should care about preserving multilateralism. Germany, again 
to its credit, has moved beyond the well-meant, but alas rather crude and pointless 
pitch that Macron had offered to Trump’s Make America Great Again refrain with 
his own message of Make the Planet Great Again (Germis 2018). Maas, for exam-
ple, has been careful to argue, “Anyone who loves their country will be committed 
to cooperation. Because only if we work together will we all have a future” (Maas 
2019). This is a step in the right direction. But it is not without its problems. 
First, this is a complicated narrative (as is usually the case with most liberal 
narratives), in contrast to the simplistic us versus them stories that Trump, Brexit-
ers, and the AFD offer their supporters. Second, the emphasis on the future is all 
very well for those reasonably well-off. But for the genuinely downtrodden mem-
bers of our increasingly unequal societies, saving the future is a luxury they can-
not afford because of the extreme hardships of their current existence. Third, the 
current narrative in favour of multilateralism, even if motivated by the best intent, 
is lacklustre also perhaps because it is somewhat tautological. A narrative that sug-
gests that we should all support multilateralism because cooperation is inherently a 
good just does not ring true, especially in an age when there are louder and simpler 
narratives around that argue that cooperation produces major losses for specific 
groups and countries. And without a winning narrative to back it, the fight to pre-
serve multilateralism will be a losing battle. [3]
Finally, recent scholarly attention to geoeconomics, and especially the “weap-
onization of interdependence” (Farrell and Newman 2019) pose a new challenge for 
Germany’s hitherto rose-tinted view that economic interdependence (facilitated by 
multilateral institutions) would automatically result in a peace dividend. Combine 
these scholarly insights with China’s dramatic rise and controversial expansionism 
in Southeast Asia (and beyond), and it is clear that there is at least some cause to 
3 On how to build winning 
and sustainable narratives, 
see Narlikar (2020a, forth-
coming). 
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question the premises of the post-war multilateral order. If multilateral rules to 
promote economic interdependence are being used by “systemic rivals” to gain a 
geoeconomic advantage, then the rules themselves need a fundamental updating. 
Any attempts to brush away the security risks posed by unreformed multilateralism 
under the carpet will only feed the backlash against it that the Trump administra-
tion has (not always incorrectly) already fueled. A failure to recognise these dangers 
by Germany – even if in the spirit of cultivating maximum support for an inclusive 
multilateralism – will likely be quite counter-productive. 
3. Necessary Next Steps
Germany still has almost a year to go in the UNSC. Building on the efforts that it 
has already put into advancing the multilateralism debate, it can certainly get more 
bang for its buck. To achieve this, at least three steps will be necessary.
First, Germany needs to have a serious discussion with its own electorate as 
well as its allies on the values that it believes should underpin multilateralism. Nar-
row interpretations of this issue have sometimes taken countries like Germany and 
Canada into the direction of labour standards and environmental standards. But 
this is quite short-sighted. Amidst the great power competition that is currently 
underway, dramatic fractures are clearly emerging over first-order values, e.g. de-
mocracy, pluralism, an embedded liberalism, rule of law, and so forth. The time is 
coming when Germany will have to take a clear line on what its brand of multilat-
eralism stands for, what its goals are, what norms it should uphold. This will also 
mean that the Alliance of Multilateralism will have to sharpen its identity – and also 
its boundaries.
Second, a winning narrative needs to be developed for multilateralism. Such 
a narrative would have to show the direct benefit that a reformed multilateralism 
could offer to people – not only tomorrow, but also today. It would need to have 
individual and group appeal. Plus it would need to work across different levels of 
politics – local, regional, national, and global – across the Alliance for Multilateral-
ism but also within the national populations of allied governments. 
Third, Germany can no longer afford to be naïve about the possibility that the 
interdependence that it has so vigorously espoused may in fact be weaponised by 
strategic rivals. A fundamental reform of multilateral institutions is necessary. On 
this front, Germany would be well-served – also in its own cause – to join forces 
with those states from the global south that are already invested in a reform agenda 
(for instance of the UNSC). Additionally though, given the risks that weaponised 
interdependence and economic statecraft pose today, multilateral rules will have to 
be updated to prevent their misuse and abuse. A reformed system may still be able 
to include China. But frankly, it is difficult to see how we can return to a full-blown 
multilateralism – universal and far-reaching in ambition – without seeing some 
clear signals that our direct competitors are also willing to rein in their own power. 
Insofar as these concerns are shared across the different world regions, it will be 
vital that Germany works closely together with European partners, India, Japan, 
and others. Identifying partners for the Alliance for Multilateralism on the basis of 
shared first-order values would help imbibe the debate and the practice of multilat-
eralism with greater meaningfulness.
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